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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In his paper on the fallacy of composition, Maurice Finocchiaro puts forward several 
important theses about this fallacy. He also uses it to illustrate his view that fallacies 
should be studied in light of the notion of meta-argumentation at the core of his 
recent book (Finocchiaro, 2013).  
First, he expresses his puzzlement. Some authors have claimed that this 
fallacy is quite common (this is the ubiquity thesis) but it seems to have been 
neglected by scholars. This second point does not seem to be controversial but the 
ubiquity thesis is open to discussion. For instance, Finocchiaro reminds us that 
Kahane (1973, p. 244) granted that this fallacy has not been given much scrutiny 
and explained this lack of interest by its rarity. This comforting explanation clearly 
goes against the ubiquity thesis. 
How is it that few studies have been devoted to this fallacy? There is certainly 
no obvious relation between the frequency of a fallacy and the interest that scholars 
pay to it. It is likely that a fallacy having many faces or depending on many 
circumstantial parameters will inspire more studies than a simpler one, but things 
may not be that simple. If there is a link between the ubiquity of the fallacy of 
composition and the fact that there are few studies about it, it may be because many 
compositional problems go unnoticed or are not identified as such. The difficulty to 
detect and qualify some compositional problems is quite compatible with the 
ubiquity thesis. In any case, Finocchiaro rightly stresses that this fallacy should be 
more precisely and more empirically documented.  
 
2. PARTS AND WHOLE 
 
First, it should be remembered that this fallacy concerns a relation which is often 
quite straightforward but is sometimes quite tricky. It is even the subject matter of a 
theory – mereology – having a far reaching root in philosophy and a lot of 
contemporary developments in logic, ontology, metaphysics and psychology. 
Mereology can be briefly defined as the study of parthood or of the relation between 
parts and whole. One of its basic claims is that compositional reasoning is quite 
frequent and a plausible explanation of this frequency is that the relation between 
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parts and whole would be one of the most elementary cognitive links.  
However, it is not always the same link but rather a kind of relation for it has 
modalities much more diverse and complex than it may appear at first sight. This is 
certainly why inferences from parts to whole follow no common logical rule, are not 
always valid and are open to a variety of mistakes and confusions. If this is true, 
Finocchiaro is right to criticize some textbooks examples which are too gross to be 
faithful to the complexity of the parts-whole relation. Of course, in a didactic context 
you often need easy examples to show that the compositional inference that is valid 
in some cases is also blatantly false in others. But this does not account for the 
variety of relations which may exist between parts and whole. Just look at the 
following list of examples that is certainly not exhaustive: 
 
(1) My arm is part of my body. 
(2) The west side is the most typical area of this city. No! It’s the north! 
(3) Each and every citizen is part of the country.  
(4) Paris, it's France! 
(5) Sorry, I missed part of your talk. 
 
Mathematics is a field full of stimulating ideas about composition. Remember, 
for instance, Russell's barber, one of the most famous paradoxes that plagued early 
set theory. A crucial move to avoid it has been to make an explicit distinction 
between being a member of a set and being a part of this set. But this is not an easy 
distinction. It looks difficult and artificial for beginners. It is usually easy for them to 
understand that this or that integer or a small group of integers makes a part of 
integers. But it is more difficult to accept a sharp distinction between the number 
seven, one of the elements of the set of integers and the set having seven as only 
member, this set being a part, not an element, of the set of integers. 
Infinite sets also provide puzzling examples against the common, but false, 
compositional principle that the parts are necessarily smaller than the whole. Many 
people ‘intuitively’ think that even integers are less numerous than integers. At first 
sight, they are two times less numerous since only one on two integers is even. But 
this is “a type of common but logically incorrect argument”, namely a fallacy 
according to a definition offered by Finocchiaro (2005, p. 113). This mistaken 
reasoning is not isolated but typical and so, to keep on with Finocchiaro's normative 
vocabulary, it is a “logical sin” (2005, p. 116) or “a vice of argumentation” as he said 
in the first sentence of his talk. Fortunately, this collective mathematical vice had a 
happy end, for mathematicians finally triumphed over it and can now spread the 
good news that even integers are as numerous as integers. In this case, we should 
now not hesitate to bridge the gap from part to whole. 
You do not need to call to the abstruse mathematics of the infinite to doubt 
the necessity of the “law” that the parts are smaller than the whole. My first example 
– “my arm is part of my body” – seems a paradigmatic positive instance of it. But 
look at the fifth one, “Sorry, I missed part of your talk”. Who can say that it is not a 
polite understatement meaning “I missed the whole of your talk”? And what should 
we think of “I like the whole of your talk, especially the first part”? In my opinion, 
the pragmatics of composition (and division) in the field of politeness should suffice 
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to convince us of the ubiquity of compositional reasonings (at least in this field) and 
also of their fallacious versions. This strengthens my opinion that John Woods 
(2004) has a good point when he says that behind a fallacy lies a philosophical 
problem: the fallacy of composition and its twin sister about division certainly come 
out of a general difficult epistemic relation between whole and parts. 
 
3. COMPOSITION 
 
Michel's iron law is an example of a compositional move that you may (or may not) 
identify as fallacious. This is all the more difficult since the fallacy can have different 
structures. Finocchiaro distinguishes three possibilities: reasoning from premises 
using a term distributively to a conclusion using the same term collectively, 
reasoning from some properties of the parts to the same property of the whole, 
reasoning from some property of the members of the group to the same property of 
the entire group. If you stick too much to one structure you can miss another one.  
T. Govier (2007) discusses another possibility. Some fallacies of composition 
can go unnoticed because they are assimilated or reduced to another fallacy. First, 
she considers two common verbal practices involving a compositional move. The 
first one is synecdoche, the figure of speech using a part to mean the whole. “Paris, 
it’s France” is an example opening to others like “Yesterday, Paris met Berlin in 
Italy”. The second one is stereotype, a notion that Govier briefly defines as the fact 
that “a group is cast according to the attributes of some few individuals within it” (p. 
508). Compositional problems are present here but no reasoning, therefore no 
fallacious reasoning, is yet clearly involved.  
When she gets to fallacies, Govier sees two candidates to welcome the fallacy 
of composition: hasty generalization and equivocation. First, let us note that these 
two fallacies are themselves not reducible to a simple scheme: they are what I will 
call generic fallacies. This feature is an advantage to host other fallacies.  
One aspect of what is quickly called “the” problem of induction is that an 
(incomplete) induction, ampliative or not, is always more or less hasty. More or less, 
that is the question. This native vice of induction seems to have contaminated some 
fallacious compositional reasonings. And as far as equivocation is concerned, 
Finocchiaro reminds us that long before Van Eemeren and Grootendorst stressed 
that bridging the gap from part to whole is favored by equivocation, Aristotle dealt 
with composition and division in the section of On Sophistical Refutations devoted to 
fallacies “in dictione” where equivocation appears in several places. Thus, it seems 
quite possible that the study of the fallacy of composition spreads well beyond the 
academic works which are explicitly devoted to it. You should just look for it under 
different headings. 
 
4. META-ARGUMENTATION 
 
According to Finocchiaro, fallacies are neither theoretical concepts used only by 
argumentation theorists, nor ordinary arguments even though they are quite 
common. They should be considered as meta-arguments, that is arguments about 
ground-level arguments which are themselves what I have just called ordinary 
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arguments, that is argument about topics other than the argument at stake. This 
highlights a feature that seems to me quite essential for the study of fallacies. I am 
currently doing some research on the history of fallacies and I had the opportunity 
to browse the whole catalogue of the French National Library, the largest French 
library. This overview confirmed my former impression that there is almost no 
theoretical literature on fallacies in French. Of course, we know that there are 
important writings like medieval contributions and the famous chapters of the 
Logique of Port-Royal. But when you just look at the titles of books and documents 
from the eighteenth to the twentieth century there is almost nothing if you compare 
with the blooming English literature on this topic. I mean that there is almost no 
theoretical literature. But there is an amount of titles including eclectic charges of 
fallacy, all of them confirming an unsurprising constant: fallacies are committed by 
an opponent, by an opposing party. So, the charge of fallacious reasoning is not a 
privilege of remote argumentation theorists but is also widely used on the 
battlefield to disqualify the opponent's views. Just like meta-discursive remarks can 
be part of an ordinary speech, meta-arguments do not necessarily come after 
ground level arguments or only from critical outsiders like argumentation theorists. 
But ordinary arguers do not qualify them as meta-argumentation for they are not 
concerned by this kind of theoretical distinction.    
Maurice Finocchiaro discusses Michel’s “iron law of oligarchy” and its critics. 
It should be noted that these critics are convincing only if you assume that in a 
democracy, there is normally some competition between political parties or other 
groups playing a major political role. To make more salient the importance of this 
implicit normative assumption for the meta-arguments stressing a fallacy of 
composition, imagine a country claiming to be a democracy but where there are also 
strong connections or interpenetrations between the most influential political 
groups, for instance between political parties and the media, between the 
government and a party, or between unions and the state administration. In such a 
case Dahl’s and Lipset’s meta-arguments are certainly weaker, for the oligarchy that 
they acknowledge in the parties and the other politically influential groups could 
spread beyond their institutional limits, certainly in a hidden way, and contaminate 
the whole political system. So, the relevance of the charge of fallacy of composition 
depends on the political presumptions shared, or not, by Michel and his critics. I am 
not claiming that this conclusion stressing the dialectical side of the charge of fallacy 
applies in any case. It still has to be documented by further studies.   
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